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INTRODUCTION 
The concept of “environmental human rights” is gradually gaining 
support in wider academic and policy circles, but it remains an 
emerging and essentially contested notion. While there is little 
argument about the existence of a number of individual 
environmental rights protected by domestic law, whether 
constitutional or not, and by supra/transnational and classical 
international law, some human rights scholars are reluctant to give 
them the “human right”/ “fundamental right” quality label, for reasons 
on which I will not dwell in this Article. For the sake of argument, 
and merely for the purposes of this Article—without taking a position 
in this particular controversy—I will use the designation 
“environmental human rights” to refer to the following set of rights, 
the first three of a procedural nature and the fourth substantive: 
 The right of access to environmental information; 
 The right to public participation in environmental decision-
making; 
 The right of access to justice in environmental matters; and, 
finally, 
 The (still contested) substantive human right to a healthy 
environment. 
In Europe, the interface between environmental protection and 
human rights is characterized by a strong incidence of legal pluralism. 
The field of environmental human rights is governed by a range of 
overlapping legal orders, namely: domestic law, the supranational law 
of the European Union (obviously applicable only for those European 
States which are members of the EU) and two different areas of 
conventional public international law, i.e., international 
environmental law (especially the Aarhus Convention) and the 
European regional system for the protection of human rights. This 
system was set up after the second World War under the auspices of 
the Council of Europe (an older organization with a wider 
membership than the EU) by the 1950 European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR), and 
developed through the case-law of the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECtHR), not to be confused with the Court of Justice of the 
EU, generally referred to as European Court of Justice (ECJ) which 
sits in Luxembourg, not Strasbourg like the ECtHR). 
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The purpose of this Article is to analyze these overlapping and 
interlocking legal orders in their complex interactions, focusing on the 
question whether the EU can be considered a leader in the field of the 
legal recognition and protection of environmental human rights, or 
should rather be seen as a follower or even an outright laggard when 
comparing its law with the relevant rules of public international law. 
Issues of interactions between national law and both EU and 
international law fall largely outside the scope of this Article. We will 
examine each of the rights considered in turn, after some introductory 
considerations aimed at placing the relevant issues in perspective. 
I 
AN EMERGING EUROPEAN MODEL OF ENVIRONMENTAL 
DEMOCRACY AND CITIZENSHIP CENTERED AROUND THE AARHUS 
CONVENTION 
Together with the notion of “environmental democracy”, the 
concept of “environmental citizenship” gained currency in 
international political discourse in the wake of the adoption of the 
Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in 
Decision-Making, and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters 
(Aarhus Convention), at the ‘Environment for Europe’ ministerial 
conference in Aarhus on June 25, 1998. This pan-European regional 
treaty, at the interface of environmental law and human rights law, 
was negotiated within the institutional framework of the United 
Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE). It marked the 
beginning of what could be termed a legal and political revolution in 
which the very relations between European States and their own 
citizens in the field of environmental policy became subject to 
international regulation. 
The Aarhus Convention entered into force more than ten years ago, 
on October 30, 2001, following ratification by sixteen states. The 
Convention now has forty-six contracting parties, including the 
European Union and its twenty-seven member states, ten countries in 
transition from the Eastern European, Caucasus, and Central Asian 
(EECCA) region (with the notable exception of Russia and 
Uzbekistan), and all candidate and potential candidate countries for 
accession to the EU in the Western Balkan region (with the exception 
of Kosovo, which cannot currently accede to the Convention since it 
is not a member state of the United Nations). Of the other two current 
EU candidate countries, Iceland signed the Convention in 1998 but 
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did not ratify it until 2011, while Turkey did not sign but actually 
announced in 1998 that it had no intention of becoming a party. 
The latter country may have to reconsider its position towards the 
Convention in the context of its bid for EU membership, like Iceland 
did. Other laggards in Western Europe, among the member states of 
the Council of Europe, are Switzerland, Monaco, and Liechtenstein; 
all three are signatories to the Convention. While Switzerland has 
announced it is currently considering ratification, the two microstates 
have remained silent and absent ever since signing the Convention in 
1998, and are apparently facing no domestic political pressure to 
become contracting parties. 
The United States and Canada, though full members of UNECE, 
elected not to participate in the negotiation of the Convention and 
have stayed outside the Aarhus regime since its inception, though 
they did participate in the negotiation of the Convention’s Protocol on 
Pollutant Release and Transfer Registers (PRTR), without eventually 
signing it. 
Before Aarhus, rules on access to environmental information, 
consultation, and participation of citizens in environmental decision-
making by public authorities and access to justice in environmental 
matters had gradually emerged in the national environmental law of 
most western European states and, subsequently, in the environmental 
law of the then European Economic Community (EEC), which later 
became the European Community (EC) and was the predecessor 
organization of the European Union (EU).1 The 1992 Rio Declaration 
had already elevated this triptych of procedural environmental rights 
to the status of soft law principles at the global level. But it was the 
 
1 The term “European Union” was formally introduced by the 1992 Treaty of 
Maastricht. From the entry into force of that treaty, it became established in the media, 
political discourse as well as common language as the preferred term to the legally still 
correct European Community (EC), which, from Maastricht, became the official name of 
the former European Economic Community (EEC). This places legal scholars—in their 
work on EEC/EC/EU law—before a difficult methodological choice: that between legal 
accuracy and readability. The former option would strictly adopt the legally correct 
method of systematically referring to the institutions of the EU and the EU itself in the 
term which was legally valid at any given point in time, and to apply the same approach to 
the numbering of treaty articles, which has also changed repeatedly during the process of 
enlargement, deeper integration, and increasing institutional complexity. In this article, I 
have opted to prioritize readability for the reader who is not familiar with the 
chronological intricacies of EU law, by systematically having recourse to the latter term, 
regardless of time. Formally “EU law” does not cover the same thing today as it did in 
1992, 1997, or as it does now since the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009. 
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Aarhus Convention which completed the process of juridification2 
and Europeanization3 of citizens’ environmental rights as the 
standards laid down in an international legal instrument were in turn 
further articulated and consolidated in EU environmental law. 
The Aarhus catalogue of procedural environmental rights is 
intrinsically linked to a fundamental rights-based approach to 
environmental governance. Throughout Europe, both within and 
beyond the borders of the EU, individual citizens and especially 
environmental groups have used the Aarhus Convention and the 
resulting EU Directives and Regulations in their efforts to increase the 
transparency and accountability of environmental public policies at all 
levels and enforce substantive environmental norms in litigation 
against both public authorities and private actors. Aarhus effectively 
constitutes the bridge—hopefully not the ultimate one “at the edge of 
the world,” to paraphrase an important recent book by former CEQ 
Chair and current Yale Dean Gus Speth4—between international 
environmental law and international human rights law in the 
European legal space. There are several arguments supporting this 
thesis, the most important of which is no doubt that the Convention 
explicitly recognizes, in its preamble as well as its Article 1 (stating 
its “Objective”), the existence of a substantive human right to a 
quality environment, and it states that a set of three procedural 
environmental rights are to be guaranteed precisely to enable citizens 
to “assert” this substantive right. 
We will return to this complex issue at the end of this Article. But 
let us first turn to each of the procedural rights, while bearing in mind 
that each of these rights should itself be viewed by human rights 
lawyers as linked to certain civil and political rights well-recognized 
under international human rights law, i.e., respectively, freedom of 
information, the right to political participation in its various forms, 
and, last but not least, access to justice in the event of alleged 
violations of substantive rights of a civil or political nature, which 
arguably includes most environmental rights granted to individuals by 
domestic law as well as the internal law of the EU. 
 
2 See Winfried Lang, Die Verrechtlichung des internationalen Umweltschutzes: vom 
“soft law” zum “hard law,” 22 ARCHIV DES VÖLKERRECHTS 283 (1984) (Ger.). 
3 See Johan P. Olsen, The Many Faces of Europeanization, 40 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 
921 (2002). 
4 JAMES GUSTAVE SPETH, THE BRIDGE AT THE EDGE OF THE WORLD: CAPITALISM, 
THE ENVIRONMENT, AND CROSSING FROM CRISIS TO SUSTAINABILITY (2008). 
12 OREGON REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 15, 7 
II 
EU LEADERSHIP: SEPARATING FACT FROM FICTION 
The Aarhus ministerial declaration—subscribed to enthusiastically 
by the EU and its then fifteen member states—praised the Aarhus 
Convention as “a significant step forward both for the environment 
and for democracy.”5 In their “renewed” EU Sustainable 
Development Strategy (SDS), adopted in June 2006,6 EU heads of 
state and government stressed the significance of the Convention for 
the Union’s objectives in the field of sustainable development in the 
following terms: 
The EU welcomes civil society initiatives which aim at creating 
more ownership for sustainable development and will therefore 
intensify dialogue with relevant organisations and platforms that 
can offer valuable advice by drawing attention to the likely impact 
of current policies on future generations. In this context, the EU will 
also continue to promote full implementation of the Aarhus 
Convention Access to Information, Public Participation in 
Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters.7 
The ultimate aim of the Convention is to increase the openness and 
democratic legitimacy of government policies on environmental 
protection and to develop a sense of responsibility among citizens by 
giving them the means to obtain information, to assert their interests 
by participating in the decision-making process, to monitor the 
decisions of public bodies, and to take legal action to protect their 
environment. The “engaged, critically aware public”—as the Aarhus 
declaration calls it—is seen as both an essential player and a 
partner—or stakeholder, to use a fashionable term—in the 
formulation and implementation of environmental policies. 
As a popular target of citizen activism in the EU and its member 
states, environmental policy has become a testing ground for efforts 
to transcend traditional models of representative democracy in 
Europe. Thus, developments in the environmental field have 
prefigured the wider debate on “[t]he principle of participatory 
 
5 United Nations, Econ. & Soc. Council, Fourth Ministerial Conference, Environment 
for Europe, Report on the Conference ¶ 40, U.N. Doc. ECE/CEP/41 10 (June 23–25, 
1998). 
6 For a detailed analysis of this Strategy, see Marc Pallemaerts, The EU and Sustainable 
Development: An Ambiguous Relationship, in THE EUROPEAN UNION AND SUSTAINABLE 
DEVELOPMENT: INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL DIMENSIONS 19 (Marc Pallemaerts & Albena 
Azmanova eds., 2006). 
7 Council of the European Union, Renewed EU Sustainable Development Strategy, EU 
Council Doc. 10917/06, Annex, at 26 (2006) (emphasis added). 
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democracy”8 that was enshrined under this heading in Article 46 of 
the draft treaty establishing a constitution for Europe in 2003, and 
subsequently in Article I-47 of the now defunct treaty establishing a 
constitution for Europe in 2004. 
Though the title of the relevant article and hence the term 
“participatory democracy” eventually disappeared from the Treaty of 
Lisbon as signed in 2007—and in force since 2009—its substantive 
provisions themselves were inserted into Article 11 of the amended 
Treaty on European Union (TEU), which now provides, inter alia, 
that “[t]he institutions shall maintain an open, transparent and regular 
dialogue with representative associations and civil society.”9 
Similarly, an “open and democratic society” and “involvement of 
citizens” are explicitly listed among the “policy guiding principles” of 
sustainable development endorsed by the European Council in the 
2006 SDS.10 According to those provisions, clearly inspired by the 
Aarhus Convention, the EU seeks to “[g]uarantee citizens’ rights of 
access to information and ensure access to justice,” to “[d]evelop 
adequate consultation and participatory channels for all interested 
parties and associations,” and to “[e]nhance the participation of 
citizens in decision-making.”11 
Ironically, the EU and its member states, which like to style 
themselves as champions of environmental democracy in global fora, 
constituted only a small minority of the contracting parties to the 
Aarhus Convention until the enlargement of the EU to twenty-five 
member states on May 1, 2004. At the time of the first Meeting of the 
Parties (MOP-1), hosted by Italy in Lucca, in October 2002, only two 
other member states of the then EU-15 were actually parties to the 
Convention. It is thanks to the new member states, most of which had 
already ratified it prior to their accession to the EU, that a majority of 
the Union’s member states had the status of contracting parties at the 
time of the second MOP (MOP-2) in Almaty, Kazakhstan, in May 
2005. The European Community itself barely managed to deposit its 
instrument of approval in time to be represented at that meeting as a 
party, and actually did so long before the entry into force of the 
 
8 Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe art. 46, Jul. 18, 2003, CONV 
850/03, available at http://european-convention.eu.int/docs/treaty/cv00850.en03.pdf. 
9 Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty 
Establishing the European Community art 8b(2), Dec. 13, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C306) 1. 
10 Renewed EU Sustainable Development Strategy, supra note 7. 
11 Id. at 4–5 (3rd & 4th Guiding Principle). 
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internal legislation designed to ensure the Convention’s application 
by its own institutions.12 
The overall political, economic, and environmental context in 
which the Aarhus Convention, with its organized system of 
procedural environmental rights, emerged as the international legal 
flagship of “environmental democracy” in post-Cold War Europe in 
the late 1990s––soon to find its enthusiastic signatories on both sides 
of the former Iron Curtain confronted with various implementation 
problems as the political and economic circumstances evolved due to 
interrelated factors such as economic transition and liberalization, 
globalization, and EU enlargement.13 
As will be shown in this Article, the EU’s legal commitment to the 
Aarhus Convention and its principles has not always actually been as 
strong as the political rhetoric of its institutions might have suggested. 
In fact, ever since the drafting of the Convention in the late 1990s, 
there have been many legal ambiguities and tensions in the 
relationship between the Aarhus Convention regime and the EU legal 
order, as well as the internal legal order of many EU member states. 
At the same time, nevertheless, there has also been a dynamic 
interaction, and sometimes beneficial cross-fertilization, between EU 
law and the rules of conventional international law laid down in the 
Convention, at least in some areas. 
The Aarhus Convention regime continues to interact with European 
Union law almost continually. Over the last few years, the Court of 
Justice of the European Union (the Luxembourg-based ECJ, not to be 
mixed up with the ECtHR in Strasbourg) has ruled on important 
questions concerning the interpretation of provisions of EU Directives 
adopted to implement the Convention, and, most recently, on the 
interpretation of the access to justice provisions of the Convention 
itself, which it considers to be “an integral part of the legal order of 
 
12 Council Regulation 1367/2006, 2006 O.J. (L264) 13 (EC). 
13 See Stephen Stec, EU Enlargement, Neighbourhood Policy and Environmental 
Democracy, in THE AARHUS CONVENTION AT TEN: INTERACTIONS AND TENSIONS 
BETWEEN CONVENTIONAL INTERNATIONAL LAW AND EU ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 35, 35–
54 (Marc Pallemaerts ed., 2011) [hereinafter THE AARHUS CONVENTION AT TEN]; 
Francesco La Camera, Ecology, Economy and Environmental Democracy, in THE 
AARHUS CONVENTION AT TEN, supra, at 17–34; Albena Azmanova, The Legal and 
Political Economic Imperatives of Sustainable Development in Eastern Europe: 
Reconciling Post-Communism with EU Membership, in THE EUROPEAN UNION AND 
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL DIMENSIONS, supra note 6, at 
313–36. 
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the European Union”14 Several more relevant cases are still pending 
before the EU courts,15 and an increasing number of requests for 
preliminary rulings on all three ‘pillars’ of the Convention and its 
implementing legislation are referred to the ECJ by national courts in 
EU member states. 
At the same time, there are also new developments on the 
legislative front. As already noted above, the entry into force of the 
Treaty of Lisbon on December 1, 2009, has further enshrined 
participatory principles in primary EU law, and moreover conferred 
legally binding status on the provisions of the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights, which includes an article on environmental 
protection and another on everyone’s right to an effective remedy 
before a tribunal against violations of rights guaranteed by EU law.16 
Though the Treaty of Lisbon, by modifying the former Article 230 
EC (now Article 263 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union (TFEU)), has somewhat enlarged the right of access to justice 
for natural and legal persons seeking to challenge the legality of 
certain acts of EU institutions before the EU courts, these limited 
changes, in themselves, are not sufficient to remedy the serious 
problem of inadequate access to the Union judicature for members of 
the public in the light of Article 9, paragraph 3 of the Aarhus 
Convention. Will the restrictive jurisprudence of the Court of Justice 
evolve to ensure “effective protection of EU environmental law”,17 
not only by national courts but also at the level of the EU judicature 
or will further treaty changes and legislative initiatives be required? 
These are some of the questions raised by the interactions between 
EU law and conventional international law in the field of 
environmental rights. In the following sections of this Article we shall 
explore these interactions for each of the three procedural 
environmental rights, as well as for the autonomous, substantive right 
 
14 Case C-240/09, Lesoochranárske zoskupenie VLK v. Mininisterstvo živothého 
prostredia Slovenskej republiky, 2011 E.C.R. nyr, ¶ 30. The implications of this ECJ 
ruling on the interpretation of Article 9(3) of the Convention are further discussed in Jonas 
Ebbesson, Access to Justice at the National Level: Impact of the Aarhus Convention and 
European Union Law, in THE AARHUS CONVENTION AT TEN, supra note 13, at 245–70. 
15 See, e.g., Case C-266/09, Stichting Natuur en Milieu v. College voor de toelating van 
gewasbeschermingsmiddelen en biociden, 2010 E.C.R. I-13119; Case T-338/08,  Stichting 
Natuur en Milieu and Pesticide Action Network Eur. v. European Comm’n, 2012 E.C.R. 
nyr (appeal pending before the ECJ, Case C-404/12 P). 
16 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union arts. 37, 47, Mar. 30, 2010 
O.J. (C 83/389). 
17 Case C-240/09, Lesoochranárske zoskupenie, supra note 14, at ¶ 49. 
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to a healthy environment. By comparing the state of EU law with the 
relevant rules of international law, we shall examine whether the EU 
is a leader in the recognition of environmental human rights, or rather 
lags behind the standards laid down in international law. As we shall 
see, the overall picture that emerges from this analysis is rather 
complex. 
III 
EARLY PROVISIONS ON ACCESS TO INFORMATION IN THE EU 
The decision to elaborate an international, legally binding 
instrument on citizens’ environmental rights within the framework of 
the UNECE, taken at a pan-European conference of environment 
ministers in Sofia in October 1995, was prompted by earlier 
developments in EC environmental law, such as the 1985 Directive 
on environmental impact assessment (EIA)18 and, above all, the 1990 
Directive on freedom of access to environmental information.19 
Since its adoption and signature in June 1998, the Aarhus 
Convention has clearly influenced the further development of EU 
environmental law and even contributed to the on-going debate on the 
transparency and accountability of EU institutions, as well as to a 
number of wide-ranging reforms in European governance, such as the 
adoption of Regulation No. (EC) 1049/2001 regarding public access 
to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents.20 The 
latter Regulation, which is currently undergoing revision,21 is the EU 
equivalent of the U.S. Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), albeit one 
with considerably fewer ‘teeth’ and weaker enforcement than its 
transatlantic counterpart.22 
Specifically, in order to implement the Aarhus Convention, the EU 
has adopted a series of new legislative acts and revised several 
existing ones since 2003. Directive 2003/4/EC of January 28, 2003, 
 
18 Council Directive 85/377/EEC, on the Assessment of the Effects of Certain Public 
and Private Projects on the Environment, 1985 O.J. (L 175) 40 (EC). 
19 Council Directive 90/313/EEC, of 7 June 1990 on the Freedom of Access to 
Information on the Environment, 1990 O.J. (L 158) 56 (EC). 
20 Regulation 1049/2001, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 
2001 Regarding Public Access to European Parliament, Council and Commission 
Documents, 2001 O.J. (L 145) 43 (EC). 
21 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council regarding 
public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents, COM (2008) 
229 final (Apr. 30, 2008). 
22 For a critique of EU access to documents policy, see Deirdre M. Curtin, Chair of 
Professor of Law at the University of Amsterdam, Inaugural Lecture: Top Secret Europe 
(Oct. 20, 2011). 
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on Public Access to Environmental Information23 replaced the earlier 
Directive 90/313/EEC and expanded citizens’ rights of access to 
environmental information held by public authorities in member 
states. Directive 2003/35/EC of May 26, 2003,24 provided for public 
participation in respect to the drawing up of certain plans and 
programs relating to the environment in the member states and 
strengthened the provisions on public participation in the 1985 EIA 
Directive and in Directive 96/61/EC on Integrated Pollution 
Prevention and Control (IPPC),25 which was recently recast as 
Directive 2010/75/EU on Industrial Emissions (IED).26 
The 2003 PRTR Protocol led to the adoption by the European 
Parliament and Council, on January 18, 2006, of Regulation No. (EC) 
166/2006 establishing the European Pollutant Release and Transfer 
Register (E-PRTR),27 even before the entry into force of the Protocol 
itself. Finally, Regulation No. (EC) 1367/2006, adopted on September 
6, 2006, deals with the application of the procedural rights guaranteed 
by the Aarhus Convention at the level of EU institutions and bodies.28 
IV 
TENSIONS BETWEEN UNION LAW AND INTERNATIONAL LAW ON 
ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS 
The interaction between the Aarhus Convention and EU law has 
not always been without problems. Tensions have in fact risen 
 
23 Council Directive 2003/4/EC, on Public Access to Environmental Information and 
Repealing Council Directive 90/313/EEC, 2003 O.J. (L 41) 26. 
24 Council Directive 2003/35/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 
May 2003 Providing for Public Participation in Respect of the Drawing up of Certain 
Plans and Programmes Relating to the Environment and Amending with Regard to Public 
Participation and Access to Justice Council Directives 85/337/EEC and 96/61/EC, 2003 
O.J. (L 156) 17. 
25 Council Directive 96/61/EC, of 24 September 1996 Concerning Integrated Pollution 
Prevention and Control, 1996 O.J. (L 257) 26. 
26 Directive 2010/75/EU, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 
November 2010 on Industrial Emissions (Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control), 
2010 O.J. (L 334) 17. 
27 Regulation (EC) No 166/2006, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 
January 2006 Concerning the Establishment of a European Pollutant Release and Transfer 
Register and Amending Council Directives 91/689/EEC and 96/61/EC, 2006 O.J. (L 33) 1. 
28 Regulation (EC) No 1367/2006, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 
September 2006 on the Application of the Provisions of the Aarhus Convention on Access 
to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in 
Environmental Matters to Community Institutions and Bodies, 2006 O.J. (L 264) 13. 
18 OREGON REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 15, 7 
between normative developments within the framework of the Aarhus 
Convention and the internal legislation and policies of the EU. 
For instance, an EU Commission proposal for a directive on access 
to justice in environmental matters,29 aiming to harmonize national 
legislation on the subject in the member states in the spirit of the 
Convention, remains stalled in the Council of the EU since 2004, 
despite the European Parliament’s support for such legislation. While 
prospects for the adoption of this proposal for a general directive on 
access to justice in environmental matters remain bleak, the 
Commission has proposed to include detailed rules not only on access 
to information and public participation, but also on access to justice in 
its proposal for a revision30 of the 1996 “Seveso II” Directive31 on the 
control of major-accident hazards involving dangerous substances, 
which it presented to the European Parliament and Council in 
December 2010. This proposal was adopted on July 4, 2012 as 
Directive 2012/18/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council 
on the control of major-accident hazards involving dangerous 
substances.32 In its final form, it includes an access to justice 
provision, though the Commission’s original proposal was 
substantially modified on this point. 
From 2001 to 2005, the European Commission and a group of 
member states actively opposed, and forced the EU to obstruct 
negotiations on proposals to amend the Aarhus Convention in order to 
provide for public participation in decision-making on the placing on 
the market and deliberate release into the environment of genetically 
modified organisms (GMOs). They did so on the grounds that these 
proposals would interfere with existing EU legislation on the subject 
(Directive 2001/18/EC33 and Regulation (EC) No 1829/200334) and 
 
29 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Access to 
Justice in Environmental Matters, COM (2003) 624 final (Oct. 24, 2003). 
30 See Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
Control of Major-Accident Hazards Involving Dangerous Substances, art. 13, 14, 22, 
COM (2010) 781 final (Dec. 21, 2010). 
31 Council Directive 96/82/EC, of 9 December 1996 on the Control of Major-Accident 
Hazards Involving Dangerous Substances, 1997 O.J. (L 10) 13. 
32 Directive 2012/18/EU, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 July 2012 
on the Control of Major-Accident Hazards Involving Dangerous Substances, Amending 
and Subsequently Repealing Council Directive 96/82/EC, art. 23, 2012 O.J. (L 197) 1. 
33 Directive 2001/18/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 March 
2001 on the Deliberate Release into the Environment of Genetically Modified Organisms 
and Repealing Council Directive 90/220/EEC, 2001 O.J. (L 106) 1. 
34 Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 
September 2003 on Genetically Modified Food and Feed, 2003 O.J. (L 268) 1. 
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conflict with the softer approach to public participation laid down in 
the global Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on 
Biological Diversity (CBD), a multilateral environmental agreement 
(MEA) to which the EU is firmly committed.35 
And, in April 2011, the Aarhus Convention Compliance 
Committee (ACCC) issued findings and recommendations pursuant to 
a communication from a member of the public, the environmental law 
NGO ClientEarth,36 in which it reviewed the EU’s compliance with 
its obligations on access to justice under the Convention. It came to 
the conclusion that, if the restrictive jurisprudence of the EU courts on 
access to justice were to continue, the EU, as a Party, would fail to 
comply with the requirements of Article 9, paragraph 3 of the 
Convention, unless the inadequate access to the Union judicature for 
members of the public were fully compensated by adequate 
administrative review procedures.37 
Meanwhile, the ECJ is increasingly being called upon to examine 
questions of access to justice under the provisions of the EIA and 
IPPC Directives, as well as under the provisions of the Aarhus 
Convention itself, that are referred to it by national courts in EU 
member states. These developments are symptomatic of the fact that 
the situation with respect to access to environmental justice for 
citizens and environmental NGOs remains far from satisfactory in 
most member states as well as at the level of the Union itself. 
  
 
35 Council Decision 2002/628/EC, of 25 June 2002 Concerning the Conclusion, on 
Behalf of the European Community, of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, 2002 O.J. (L 
201) 48; Regulation (EC) No 1946/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
15 July 2003 on Transboundary Movements of Genetically Modified Organisms, 2003 
O.J. (L 287) 1. 
36 See European Community, Communication ACCC/C/2008/32, submitted on 1 
December 2008 by ClientEarth and others, available at http://www.unece.org/env/pp 
/compliance/Compliancecommittee/32TableEC.html. 
37 United Nations, Econ. & Soc. Council, Econ. Comm. for Europe, Report of the 
Compliance Committee: Findings and Recommendations with Regard to Communication 
ACCC/C/2008/32 (Part I) Concerning Compliance by the European Union, U.N. Doc. 
ECE/MP.PP/C.1/2011/4/Add.1 (Apr. 14, 2011) [hereinafter Compliance Committee 
Report], available at http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/pp/compliance/CC-32/ece 
.mp.pp.c.1.2011.4.Add.1.e.pdf. 
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V 
EU IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FIRST ‘PILLAR’ OF THE AARHUS 
CONVENTION: DIRECTIVES 90/313/EEC AND 2003/4/EC ON 
ACCESS TO ENVIRONMENTAL INFORMATION AND THE 
ESTABLISHMENT OF POLLUTANT RELEASE AND TRANSFER 
REGISTERS 
As early as 1990, the then European Economic Community (EEC) 
adopted a Directive (90/313/EEC) on the freedom of access to 
information on the environment, whose Article 3 stipulated that 
“[s]ave as provided in this Article, Member States shall ensure that 
public authorities are required to make available information relating 
to the environment to any natural or legal person at his request and 
without his having to prove an interest.”38 However, the procedures 
for the implementation of this newly granted right were originally left 
largely at the discretion of the individual member states, or, at any 
rate, described rather summarily in the instrument, resulting in quite 
uneven levels of implementation in different member states.39 
Eight years later, the Aarhus Convention further elaborated the 
international legal basis of access to environmental information 
through a combination of two complementary approaches: 
 Access upon request (passive role for public authorities)–Article 
4: 
 Right for any member of public to obtain environmental 
information without having to show an interest (within 1 
month) 
 Requests for information can be refused only on limited, 
specified grounds40 
 Active transparency requirements (proactive role for public 
authorities)–Article 5: i.e. an obligation for public authorities to 
systematically collect and disseminate environmental 
information of their own initiative through several means, such 
as through publically accessible websites.41 
 
38 Council Directive 90/313/EEC, of 7 June 1990 on the Freedom of Access to 
Information on the Environment, art. 3, 1990 O.J. (L 158) 56 (emphasis added). 
39 See ACCESS TO ENVIRONMENTAL INFORMATION IN EUROPE: THE IMPLEMENTATION 
AND IMPLICATIONS OF DIRECTIVE 90/313/EEC 459 (Ralph E. Hallo ed., 1996). 
40  Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and 
Access to Justice in Environmental Matters art. 4, June 25, 1998, 2161 U.N.T.S. 447 
[hereinafter Aarhus Convention]. 
41 Id. art. 5. 
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The new 2003 Directive, which replaces Directive 90/313/EEC, has 
the following stated objectives: 
(a) to guarantee the right of access to environmental information 
held by or for public authorities and to set out the basic terms and 
conditions of, and practical arrangements for, its exercise; [i.e. 
‘passive’ transparency] 
(b) to ensure that, as a matter of course, environmental information 
is progressively made available and disseminated to the public        
(. . .). [i.e. ‘active’ transparency]42 
It applies to all environmental information held by or for public 
authorities in the Member States (though not by EU institutions and 
bodies, for which a separate set of rules applies). 
Like under the previous regime of Directive 90/313/EEC, the basic 
requirement of the successor instrument, Directive 2003/4/EC, is to 
provide access to environmental information upon request. Article 3, 
paragraph 1 provides: “Member States shall ensure that public 
authorities are required, in accordance with the provisions of this 
Directive, to make available environmental information held by or for 
them to any applicant at his request and without his having to state 
an interest.”43 Only limited exceptions to this right of access are 
allowed, an exhaustive list of which is laid down in Article 4, 
paragraphs 3–4.44 
In any event, whenever a national public authority considers there 
are legitimate grounds for it to derogate from the principle of 
transparency, it has a legal obligation under EU law, based on the 
corresponding provisions of the Convention, to perform a balancing 
of interests test: “The grounds for refusal mentioned in paragraphs 1 
and 2 shall be interpreted in a restrictive way, taking into account for 
the particular case the public interest served by disclosure.”45 If the 
grounds for refusal apply, partial disclosure of the requested 
information must be considered, whenever possible. In any event, the 
reasons for any refusal are to be stated in writing and notified to the 
applicant. 
 
 42 Directive 2003/4/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 January 
2003 on Public Access to Environmental Information and Repealing Council Directive 
90/313/EEC, art. 1, 2003 O.J. (L 41) 26. 
43 Id. art. 3, ¶ 1 (emphasis added). 
44 Id. art. 4. 
45 Id. art. 4, ¶ 2 (emphasis added); see also Aarhus Convention, supra note 40.  
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Even before the Convention’s entry into force, its Meeting of 
Signatories recommended the launch of negotiations on an additional 
Protocol to the Convention on Pollutant Release and Transfer 
Registers (PRTR), building upon the framework provisions of its 
Article 5, paragraph 9.46 The UNECE Committee on Environmental 
Policy established a formal working group to this end at its seventh 
session in September 2000. The negotiations were successfully 
concluded in January 2003 and the PRTR Protocol was formally 
adopted and opened for signature at an extraordinary MOP in Kiev on 
May 21, 2003, on the occasion of the fifth “Environment for Europe” 
ministerial conference held in the Ukrainian capital. It entered into 
force on October 8, 2009, and currently has thirty-one contracting 
parties, including the EU and most of its member states, except 
Greece and Italy, but no EECCA countries. 
VI 
EARLY EEC PROVISIONS ON PUBLIC PARTICIPATION 
Unlike in matters of free access to environmental information, the 
EU was only a rather modest leader in the field of public 
participation. Before the Aarhus Convention, there was no EU 
legislation specifically addressing this issue, comparable to Directive 
90/313/EEC. However, the early and very influential Directive 
85/337/EEC on EIA,47 adopted sixteen years after NEPA in the U.S., 
contained rather rudimentary provisions on consultation of the public 
on proposed activities subject to EIA procedures under EU law. The 
original Article 6, paragraph 2 of the 1985 Directive provided: 
Member States shall ensure that: 
 any request for development consent and any information 
gathered pursuant to Article 5 are made available to the public, 
 the public concerned is given the opportunity to express an 
opinion before the project is initiated.48 
 
46 See United Nations, Econ. & Soc. Council, Econ. Comm. for Europe, Report of the 
Second Meeting of the Signatories 7, U.N. Doc. CEP/WG.5/2000/2 (July 19, 2000). 
47 Council Directive 85/337/EEC, of 27 June 1985 on the Assessment of the Effects of 
Certain Public and Private Projects on the Environment, 1985 O.J. (L 175) 40, was 
repeatedly amended and recently codified as Directive 2011/92/EU of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on the Assessment of the Effects of 
Certain Public and Private Projects on the Environment, 2012 O.J. (L 26) 1. 
48 Council Directive 85/337/EEC, of 27 June 1985 on the Assessment of the Effects of 
Certain Public and Private Projects on the Environment, art. 6, 1985 O.J. (L 175) 2 
(emphasis added). 
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These early provisions in fact provided for a dual right for members 
of the public: the right to be informed of any application for consent 
for the development of activities subject to EIA, as well as of the EIA 
report itself, and a weakly formulated right to be consulted “before 
the project is initiated,” i.e., not necessarily before the permit is issued 
to the developer by the competent public authority. Under this 1985 
Directive, some member states actually had the practice of giving the 
public an opportunity to express its views on projects only after they 
had already been authorized by the competent authority. Needless to 
say, the right of public participation is rather meaningless in such 
cases. 
However, the public participation procedures of the EIA Directive 
were strengthened during the negotiation process of the Aarhus 
Convention. As a result, EU public participation standards were 
further elaborated after the EU had signed the Convention. 
VII 
THE CONTROVERSIAL ISSUE OF PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN GMO-
RELATED DECISION-MAKING: NOT A SHINING CASE OF EU 
LEADERSHIP 
A major development was the adoption of an amendment to the 
Aarhus Convention at MOP-2 in Almaty in 2005, extending its scope 
of application to decisions on the deliberate release into the 
environment and placing on the market of GMOs and making such 
decisions subject to public participation requirements. The GMO 
issue had already been a controversial matter during the negotiation of 
the Convention, with NGOs and several governments pressing for the 
inclusion of GMO-related environmental decision-making processes 
within the scope of the instrument, a proposal that was at the time 
strongly resisted by the EU, which did not have mandatory public 
participation provisions in its internal legislation on GMOs at the 
time. 
The EU was in the process of reviewing its legislation while the 
negotiations on the Aarhus Convention were drawing to a close, in the 
face of an escalating trade dispute with the United States, Canada, and 
Argentina, which resulted in dispute settlement proceedings being 
brought by those countries against the European Community before 
24 OREGON REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 15, 7 
the World Trade Organisation (WTO).49 The European Commission 
feared that any re-opening of Directive 2001/18/EC would further 
exacerbate that dispute and lead to difficult negotiations inside the 
EU. As a result of EU opposition, the provisions of Article 6 and 
Annex I of the Aarhus Convention were drafted in 1998 so as to make 
the application of public participation procedures to GMO-related 
decisions optional for the parties. 
Article 7 of Directive 90/220/EEC, as it then stood, merely 
provided for optional consultation of the public at each Member 
State’s individual discretion: “Where a Member State considers it 
appropriate, it may provide that groups or the public shall be 
consulted on any aspect of the proposed deliberate release.”50 
Accordingly, a similar measure of discretion was given to Aarhus 
contracting parties by Article 6, paragraph 11, of the Convention 
which merely provided: “Each Party shall, within the framework of its 
national law, apply, to the extent feasible and appropriate, provisions 
of [article 6] to decisions on whether to permit the deliberate release 
of genetically modified organisms into the environment.”51 
The matter was further examined by the Meeting of the Signatories 
following the adoption of the Convention. Eventually, MOP-1 in 
Lucca adopted non-binding “Guidelines on Access to Information, 
Public Participation and Access to Justice with respect to Genetically 
Modified Organisms” in 2002, while mandating further consideration 
of legally binding options in an expert working group.52 
In this forum, the EU for a long time continued to oppose the 
adoption of a formal amendment to the Convention, before eventually 
giving in to mounting political pressure, both internal and external. 
When Moldova, in the run-up to the Almaty meeting, officially 
proposed an amendment to add a new article and annex to the 
Convention providing for minimum standards of public participation 
in decision making on the placing on the market and deliberate 
release into the environment of GMOs, the Almaty Amendment could 
ultimately be adopted by the Second Meeting of the Parties to the 
 
49 Panel Report, European Communities–Measures Affecting the Approval and 
Marketing of Biotech Products, WT/DS291/R, WT/DS292/R & WT/DS293/R (Sept. 29, 
2006). 
50 Council Directive 90/220/EC, art. 7, 1990 O.J. (L 117) 33 (emphasis added). 
51 Aarhus Convention, supra note 40, art. 6, ¶ 11 (emphasis added). 
52 United Nations, Econ. & Soc. Council, Econ. Comm. for Europe, Guidelines on 
Access to Information, Public Participation and Access to Justice with respect to 
Genetically Modified Organisms, U.N. Doc. MP.PP/2003/3 (adopted by Decision I/4 of 
the Meeting of the Parties, U.N. Doc. ECE/MP.PP/2/Add.5 (Apr. 2, 2004). 
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Convention in May 2005, with the EU and its member states joining 
in the consensus. 
Once adopted, the amendment was rather speedily ratified by the 
European Community in February 2008.53 It has meanwhile been 
approved by twenty-seven parties to the Convention, including 
twenty-five member states of the EU (France and Greece are the 
laggards), Norway, and Moldova, but not a single other EECCA 
country so far.54 A further five formal approvals – including at least 
four from EECCA countries that were already contracting parties at 
the time of adoption of the amendment in May 2005—are required for 
it to enter into force. This is a consequence of the parties’ agreed 
interpretation of the provisions of Article 14 of the Convention on the 
entry into force of amendments.55 
The provisions of Directive 2001/18/EC on the deliberate release 
of GMOs for purposes other than their placing on the market contain 
an Article 9, entitled “Consultation of and information to the public,” 
which stipulates that “Member States shall . . . consult the public and, 
where appropriate, groups on the proposed deliberate release. In 
doing so, Member States shall lay down arrangements for this 
consultation, including a reasonable time-period, in order to give the 
public or groups the opportunity to express an opinion.”56 The Almaty 
Amendment inserts a new Article 6bis in the Aarhus Convention, 
which provides that: “In accordance with the modalities laid down in 
annex I bis, each Party shall provide for early and effective 
information and public participation prior to making decisions on 
whether to permit the deliberate release into the environment and 
 
53 The Community’s instrument of approval was deposited on February 1, 2008, 
pursuant to: Council Decision 2006/957/EC of December 18, 2006, on the Conclusion, on 
Behalf of the European Community, of an Amendment to the Convention on Access to 
Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in 
Environmental Matters. 2006 O.J. (L 386) 49, 46. 
54 United Nations, Amendment to the Convention on Access to Information, Public 
Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters (May 
27, 2005). The current status of formal approvals of the Amendment can be found at the 
United Nations website. UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION (last visited Apr. 10, 
2013), http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVII    
-13-b&chapter=27&lang=en. 
55 See United Nations, Econ. & Soc. Council, Econ. Comm. for Europe, Report of the 
Third Meeting of the Parties, Decision III/1, U.N. Doc. ECE/MP.PP/2008/2/Add.3 (Sept. 
26, 2008). 
56 Council Directive 2001/18/EC, art. 9, 2001 O.J. (L 106) 44 (emphasis added). 
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placing on the market of GMOs.”57 Specific modalities of public 
participation are to be laid down in the national regulatory 
frameworks of the parties, taking into account the minimum 
requirements of the Convention’s new Annex Ibis. However, the 
EU’s GMO legislation was not amended as a result of the Almaty 
Amendment, as the wording of the latter was carefully crafted so as to 
accommodate the provisions on information and consultation of the 
public that were already in force in the EU prior to its adoption. 
VIII 
PUBLIC PARTICIPATION PROVISIONS OF THE AARHUS 
CONVENTION 
The public participation provisions of the Convention apply to 
three distinct types of environmental decision-making: 
 Decisions on specific activities listed in Annex I to the 
Convention (which was largely based on the EU EIA and IPPC 
Directives as they stood in 1998) 
 Plans, programs and policies “relating to the environment” 
(Article 7) 
 The preparation of executive regulations and other generally 
applicable legally binding normative instruments (Article 8) 
The first and most detailed set of Aarhus provisions focus on specific, 
place-bound activities subject to environmental authorization and 
impact assessment procedures at the national level. When a particular 
proposed activity falls within the scope of those provisions, an 
elaborate set of procedural rules designed to ensure public 
participation applies. The rules relating to plans and programs which 
may have significant environmental effects, as laid down in Article 7 
of the Convention, are more rudimentary and leave parties 
considerable leeway in determining the actual modalities of public 
participation. It should be noted that the concept of plans and 
programs is not defined in the Convention, though it is generally 
understood as encompassing plans and programs relating to such 
matters as town and country planning, transport, and energy. The 
 
57 United Nations, Econ. & Soc. Council, Econ. Comm. for Europe, Report of the Third 
Meeting of the Parties, Decision II/1, U.N. Doc. ECE/MP.PP/2005/2/Add.2, Annex (Jun. 
20, 2005) (emphasis added). 
2013] Environmental Human Rights: Is the EU a Leader,  27 
a Follower, or a Laggard? 
same measure of national discretion exists for public participation in 
rule-making processes subject to the provisions of Article 8.58 
In order to implement the public participation provisions of the 
Aarhus Convention, the EU adopted Directive 2003/35/EC.59 This 
legislative act includes amendments to the EIA and IPPC Directives 
in order to make their procedures Aarhus-compliant. Article 7 of the 
Convention was already implemented by the SEA Directive60 with 
respect to decisions subject to strategic environmental assessment, as 
well as in the field of water management by the Water Framework 
Directive.61 Further provisions introduced by Directive 2003/35/EC 
refer to six additional EU Directives requiring member states to draw 
up various kinds of environment-related plans and programs.62 
IX 
ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN EU COURTS: THE EU AS A LAGGARD 
The third pillar of the Aarhus Convention, access to justice, 
remains by far the most controversial. In this area, the EU and many 
of its member states can only be described as laggards, as they fail to 
comply with the high standards laid down in Article 9 of the 
Convention. Under that provision, access to justice is to be guaranteed 
by Parties in three areas: 
 With respect to access to information, members of the public 
shall have access to a review procedure where their requests for 
environmental information have been denied in whole or in part 
by public authorities (Article 9, paragraph 1) 
 With respect to public participation, members of the public 
shall be given access to administrative or judicial review 
procedures to challenge the substantive or procedural legality of 
 
58 For a detailed analysis of the public participation provisions of the Convention, see 
Jerzy Jendrośka, Public Participation in Environmental Decision-Making: Interactions 
Between the Convention and EU Law and Other Key Legal Issues in Its Implementation in 
the Light of the Opinions of the Aarhus Convention Compliance Committee, in THE 
AARHUS CONVENTION AT TEN, supra note 13. 
59 Directive 2003/35/EC, 2003 O.J. (L 156) 46. 
60 Directive 2001/42/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 June 
2001 on the Assessment of the Effects of Certain Plans and Programmes on the 
Environment, 2001 O.J. (L 197) 44. 
61 Directive 2000/60/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 
2000 Establishing a Framework for Community Action in the Field of Water Policy, 2000 
O.J. (L 327) 43. 
62 Directive 2003/35/EC, 2003 O.J. (L 156) 46, Annex I. 
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decisions taken by public authorities on activities subject to the 
public participation requirements of Article 6 of the Convention 
(Article 9, paragraph 2) 
 In other areas, parties are to provide access to administrative or 
judicial procedures that enable members of the public meeting 
the criteria, if any, laid down by their domestic law, to challenge 
acts or omissions which contravene provisions of domestic law 
relating to the environment (Article 9, paragraph 3)63 
The first two cases were explicitly addressed by the EU legislator 
by including appropriate provisions requiring the member states to 
provide access to justice in accordance with the terms of Article 9, 
paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Convention in Directives 2003/4/EC and 
2003/35/EC respectively. Thus EU law, pursuant to the Aarhus 
Convention, guarantees access to justice at the level of the member 
states in respect of decisions on access to environmental information 
and specific place-bound projects or activities subject to public 
participation requirements. The relevant provisions of EU law have 
been successfully invoked before national courts by environmental 
plaintiffs against conflicting provisions of national law, and the ECJ 
has ruled that national courts have the obligation to set aside such 
conflicting provisions.64 
When it expressed its consent to be bound by the Aarhus 
Convention, the EU (at the time still formally known as the European 
Community (EC)) made a declaration of “the extent of [its] 
competence with respect to the matters governed by [the] 
Convention,” in accordance with the requirements of Article 19, 
paragraph 5 of the Convention.65 This declaration of competence 
states, in relevant part: 
[T]he European Community declares that it has already adopted 
several legal instruments, binding on its Member States, 
implementing provisions of this Convention and will submit and 
update as appropriate a list of those legal instruments to the 
 
63 Aarhus Convention, supra note 40, art. 9, ¶¶ 1–3. 
64 See, e.g., Case C-263/08, Djurgården-Lilla Värtans Miljöskyddsförening v 
Stockholms kommun genom dess marknämnd, 2009 E.C.R. I-9967; Case C-115/09, Bund 
für Umwelt und Naturschutz Deutschland, Landesverband Nordrhein-Westfalen eV v 
Bezirksregierung Arnsberg, 2011 E.C.R. Not Yet Published available at http://curia 
.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?pro=&lgrec=en&nat=&oqp=&dates=&lg=&language=en&jur=C
%2CT%2CF&cit=none%252CC%252CCJ%252CR%252C2008E%252C%252C%252C%
252C%252C%252C%252C%252C%252C%252Ctrue%252Cfalse%252Cfalse&num=C-1 
15%252F09&td=ALL&pcs=O&avg=&page=1&mat=or&jge=&for=&cid=83790. 
65 Aarhus Convention, supra note 40, art. 19, ¶ 5. 
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Depositary in accordance with Article 10 (2) and Article 19 (5) of 
the Convention. In particular, the European Community also 
declares that the legal instruments in force do not cover fully the 
implementation of the obligations resulting from Article 9 (3) of the 
Convention as they relate to administrative and judicial procedures 
to challenge acts and omissions by private persons and public 
authorities other than the institutions of the European Community 
as covered by Article 2 (2)(d) of the Convention, and that, 
consequently, its Member States are responsible for the 
performance of these obligations at the time of approval of the 
Convention by the European Community and will remain so unless 
and until the Community, in the exercise of its powers under the EC 
Treaty, adopts provisions of Community law covering the 
implementation of those obligations. 
Finally, the Community reiterates its declaration made upon signing 
the Convention that the Community institutions will apply the 
Convention within the framework of . . . relevant rules of 
Community law in the field covered by the Convention. 
The European Community is responsible for the performance of 
those obligations resulting from the Convention which are covered 
by Community law in force. . . .66 
There are at present no provisions of EU law addressing access to 
environmental justice in the cases referred to in Article 9, paragraph 3 
of the Convention. To be sure, the Commission submitted a proposal 
for a directive in this field to the Council and European Parliament in 
2003,67 but this proposed legislation has not been adopted to date due 
to strong opposition from member states within the Council. The 
member states opposing the proposed directive consider that this 
question should be properly addressed by national law and that it is up 
to the member states individually to take whatever measures they 
deem necessary in their domestic legal systems to comply with the 
obligations deriving from Article 9, paragraph. 3, exercising national 
discretion as regards the setting of criteria for locus standi. While 
some member states provide access to justice in environmental cases 
in accordance with the Convention’s provisions, a comprehensive 
comparative study commissioned by the European Commission in 
2006 showed that access to environmental justice for citizens and 
NGOs remains inadequate in the majority of member states.68 
 
66 Council Decision 2005/370/EC, 2005 O.J. (L 124) 48, Annex (emphasis added). 
67 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Access to 
Justice in Environmental Matters, COM (2003) 624 final (Oct. 24, 2003). 
68 The results of this study provide a detailed analysis of the state of the law in 25 
Member States as regards standing, costs, remedies and transparency. Inventory of EU  
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Though the EU unquestionably has the power under Article 192, 
paragraph 1 of the TFEU to adopt legislation covering this matter,69 it 
has, thus far, chosen not to exercise this power, because a majority of 
member states are opposed to the adoption of the proposed directive, 
despite the favorable opinion which the European Parliament 
expressed on the Commission’s proposal years ago. It falls outside the 
scope of this Article to assess the state of individual member state 
compliance with the access to justice provisions of the Aarhus 
Convention. 
The problem of access to justice, however, does not arise only 
before national courts, but also at the EU level. What if EU 
institutions themselves contravene provisions of EU environmental 
law? Is there access to justice at Union level for individuals or NGOs 
to challenge illegal acts or omissions of institutions? By ratifying the 
Aarhus Convention, the EU took upon itself the obligation to ensure 
that members of the public have access to administrative or judicial 
review procedures to challenge acts and omissions by EU institutions 
that contravene provisions of EU law relating to the environment. The 
procedures in question shall be available to all natural or legal 
persons, including NGOs, which “meet the criteria, if any, laid down 
in” EU law,70 shall “provide adequate and effective remedies”, and 
shall “be fair, equitable, timely and not prohibitively expensive.”71 
Article 263 of the TFEU provides for review, by the ECJ, of the 
legality of acts of EU institutions “on grounds of lack of competence, 
infringement of an essential procedural requirement, infringement of 
the Treaties or of any rule of law relating to its application, or misuse 
of powers.”72 Actions for annulment may be brought by individual 
claimants under this Treaty provision subject to strict conditions: 
 
Member States’ Measures on Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, EUROPEAN 
COMMISSION (Jan. 11, 2013), http://ec.europa.eu/environment/aarhus/study_access.htm. 
69 Provisions on access to justice have already been adopted by the Community 
legislator based on Article 175, para. 1, of the EC Treaty (the provision corresponding to 
Article 192, para. 1 of the TFEU). See Directive 2003/4/EC, of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 28 January 2003 on Public Access to Environmental Information and 
Repealing Council Directive 90/313/EEC, art. 6, 2003 O.J. (L 41) 26; Directive 
2003/35/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 May 2003 Providing for 
Public Participation in Respect of the Drawing up of Certain Plans and Programmes 
Relating to the Environment and Amending with Regard to Public Participation and 
Access to Justice Council Directives 85/337/EEC and 96/61/EC, art. 3–4, 2003 O.J. (L 
156) 17. 
70 Aarhus Convention, supra note 40, art. 9, ¶ 3, 
71 Id. art. 9, ¶ 4. 
72 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 263, Mar. 30, 2010, 2010 O.J. 
(C 326) 1 [herinafter TFEU]. 
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“Any natural or legal person may . . . institute proceedings against an 
act addressed to that person or which is of direct and individual 
concern to them. . . .”73 
The requirement of “direct and individual concern” has been 
interpreted by the ECJ in a very restrictive manner since 1963. 
According to the Court’s judgment in the Plaumann case, “persons 
other than the addressees [of the contested act] may claim that a 
decision is of direct concern to them only if that decision affects them 
. . . by reason of certain attributes which are peculiar to them, or by 
reason of factual circumstances which differentiate them from all 
other persons and thereby distinguish them individually in the same 
way as the person addressed.”74 
The paradigmatic environmental case on access to justice in the 
ECJ is the Greenpeace case, in which Greenpeace International, 
together with local NGOs and individuals residing in the Canary 
Islands, brought an action for annulment of a Commission decision to 
provide EU funding to Spain for the construction of a coal-fired 
power plant for which no proper EIA had been performed.75 Applying 
the Plaumann doctrine, the Court of First Instance (CFI) declared the 
action inadmissible.76 On appeal, the ECJ affirmed the decision, 
arguing that the contested Commission decision concerned the 
applicants only in a general and abstract fashion and that they could 
not be regarded as individually and directly concerned. The Court 
found that Article 263 of the Treaty does not grant locus standi to 
NGOs representing the collective interests of persons who are not 
themselves directly and individually concerned within the meaning of 
Plaumann.77 
In a more recent case, a number of environmental NGOs and trade 
unions brought an action for annulment of Commission Directive 
2003/112/EC including the herbicide paraquat in the EU list of active 
substances authorized for use in plant protection products.78 The CFI 
held that the “provisions [of the Directive] affect [applicants] in their 
objective capacity as entities active in the protection of the 
environment or workers’ health . . . in the same manner as any other 
 
73 Id. (emphasis added). 
74 Case 25/62, Plaumann & Co. v. Comm’n, 1963 E.C.R. 199. 
75 Case T-585/93, Stichting Greenpeace Council v. Comm’n, 1995 E.C.R. II-2205. 
76 Case T-585/93, Stichting Greenpeace Council v. Comm’n, 1995 E.C.R. II-2205. 
77 Case C-321/95 P, Stichting Greenpeace Council v. Comm’n, 1998 E.C.R. I-1651. 
78 Case T-94/04, European Envtl. Bureau v. Comm’n, 2005 E.C.R. II-4919. 
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person in the same situation” and that they could not, therefore, be 
regarded as individually concerned.79 
With a view to ensure compliance with the EU’s obligations under 
the Convention, the European Parliament and Council, on September 
6, 2006, adopted Regulation (EC) No 1367/2006 on the application of 
the provisions of the Aarhus Convention to Community institutions 
and bodies (Aarhus Regulation).80 This Regulation introduced an 
“internal review procedure” whereby environmental NGOs meeting 
certain criteria can request an EU institution or body to reconsider an 
“administrative act” taken under EU environmental law or rectify an 
omission to take such an act. It also provides that, if the NGO is not 
satisfied with the institution’s response to its request for internal 
review, or if the institution fails to respond altogether within a certain 
period of time, it can “institute proceedings before the [European] 
Court of Justice in accordance with the relevant provisions of the 
[EC] Treaty.”81 
The lack of access to environmental justice before the EU 
judicature has recently been the subject of a “communication from a 
member of the public” i.e., a complaint brought by an environmental 
NGO before the Aarhus Convention Compliance Committee against 
the EU concerning alleged non-compliance with the Aarhus 
Convention’s provisions. In its findings and recommendations 
adopted on April 14, 2011, the Compliance Committee held: 
With regard to access to justice by members of the public, the 
Committee is convinced that if the jurisprudence of the EU Courts, 
as evidenced by the cases examined, were to continue, unless fully 
compensated for by adequate administrative review procedures, the 
Party concerned would fail to comply with article 9, paragraphs 3 
and 4, of the Convention. While the Committee is not convinced 
that the Party concerned fails to comply with the Convention, given 
the evidence before it, it considers that a new direction of the 
jurisprudence of the EU Courts should be established in order to 
ensure compliance with the Convention.82 
The administrative review procedures referred to by the Committee 
were instituted by the 2006 Aarhus Regulation, ostensibly to ensure 
compliance by the Union with the principles and provisions of the 
Aarhus Convention in so far as they apply to EU institutions and 
bodies. Within the scope of this Article, it is not possible to dwell at 
 
79 Id. ¶ 53. 
80 Regulation (EC) No 1367/2006, supra note 28. 
81 Id. art. 12. 
82 Compliance Committee Report, supra note 37 (emphasis added). 
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length on the long-standing issue of access to the EU judicature for 
individuals and organisations seeking judicial review of acts of EU 
institutions which infringe provisions of EU environmental law. In a 
contribution published elsewhere, I argue that the Aarhus Regulation, 
that was adopted by the European Parliament and Council with a view 
to applying the principles of the Convention, including access to 
justice, at the level of the EU’s own institutions, inter alia by 
introducing an “internal review” procedure enabling environmental 
organizations meeting certain criteria to request reconsideration by 
these institutions, of acts or omissions, contrary to EU environmental 
law, is unlikely to be sufficient to ensure compliance by the Union 
with its Aarhus obligations, as long as the restrictive case-law of the 
ECJ on locus standi for natural and legal persons remains 
unchanged.83 The Compliance Committee is yet to rule on the 
adequacy of the internal review procedure from the perspective of 
Article 9, paragraph 3 of the Convention, but is expected to do so in 
the near future. 
The EU thus has a major problem of non-compliance with its 
obligations under Article 9, paragraph 3 of the Aarhus Convention. 
There is effectively no standing for either NGOs or individuals to 
challenge acts or omissions of EU institutions and bodies in judicial 
review procedures at the EU level, as long as the ECJ continues to 
apply its settled Plaumann case-law on locus standi, as it has 
continued to do ever since the EU became a party to the Aarhus 
Convention. Some administrative review procedures are available, but 
the main one ostensibly introduced by the EU legislator in order to 
comply with Aarhus obligations—the internal review procedure 
instituted by the Aarhus Regulation—falls far short of what would be 
required to achieve full compliance. It is only accessible to some 
environmental NGOs, and there is as yet no evidence that it provides 
an effective remedy, since any proceedings instituted by an NGO 
following an unsuccessful request for internal review addressed to an 
EU institution or body are likely to be judged by the ECJ according to 
the same restrictive criteria for standing as have been applied since 
1963.84 
 
83 Marc Pallemaerts, Access to Environmental Justice at EU Level: Has the Aarhus 
Regulation Improved the Situation?, in THE AARHUS CONVENTION AT TEN, supra note 13, 
at 271–312. 
84 The limits of access to justice under Regulation No 1367/2006 are currently being 
tested in Case T-396/09, Vereniging Milieudefensie & Stichting Stop 
Luchtverontreiniging Utrecht v. Comm’n, 2012 E.C.R. nyr. The Order of the General  
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X 
THE SUBSTANTIVE RIGHT TO A HEALTHY ENVIRONMENT: NOT 
RECOGNIZED IN EU LAW 
After reviewing the status of the procedural environmental rights in 
EU law, we will now consider the substantive fundamental right to a 
healthy environment. 
There are no legally binding provisions recognizing the 
autonomous right to a healthy environment in EU law. Yet that right 
was duly acknowledged in a high-level political declaration of the 
European Council adopted on July 7, 1990. In this Dublin Declaration 
on “The Environmental Imperative,” the heads of state and 
government of the member states of the then European Community 
proclaimed that the objective of Community action for the protection 
of the environment “must be to guarantee citizens the right to a clean 
and healthy environment.”85 This political statement, however, was 
never translated into a binding provision of primary or secondary EU 
law. 
The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, which was originally 
proclaimed in Nice on December 7, 2000, but became legally binding 
only upon the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon nine years later, 
includes a provision on “Environmental protection” (Article 37) in its 
Chapter IV (“Solidarity”). However, this clause was deliberately 
phrased as an objective of public policy rather than an individual 
human right:86 “A high level of environmental protection and the 
improvement of the quality of the environment must be integrated into 
the policies of the Union and ensured in accordance with the 
principle of sustainable development.”87 Although some members of 
the Charter convention proposed the recognition of the autonomous 
right to a healthy environment in this instrument, such a step was not 
acceptable to all. There was an obvious refusal to recognize even 
 
Court in this case—ruling that certain restrictive provisions of the aforementioned 
Regulation are inconsistent with Article 9 of the Aarhus Convention and therefore 
unlawful—is being appealed before the ECJ by the Commission, European Parliament and 
Council. See Case C-401/12 P 2012 E.C.R. 
85 Presidency Conclusions, Annex II: The Environmental Imperative, Dublin European 
Council at 24 (July 7, 1990). 
86 See HENRI SMETS, Une Charte des droits fondamentaux sans droit à 
l’environnement, in: Conseil européen du droit de l’environnement, Le droit à 
l’environnement, un droit fondamental dans l’Union européenne, Funchal, 7–50 (2001) 
(critiquing the Charter from an environmental perspective). 
87 European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights, ch. 4, art. 37 (Dec. 7, 2000) 
(emphasis added). 
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procedural environmental rights within a human rights instrument. 
What is the added value of Article 37? It is very limited, as its 
wording is essentially a restatement of language taken from existing 
treaty provisions, especially the former Article 6 EC, now Article 11 
of the TFEU, enshrining the integration principle. 
There are no explicit environmental provisions in the ECHR and its 
additional protocols either. In the early 1970s, some proposals were 
made to elaborate a protocol to this Convention recognizing the right 
to a healthy environment, but these initiatives were unsuccessful. 
However, this has not prevented the development of significant and 
still growing case-law, in which the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR) has firmly established a link between certain serious forms 
of environmental impairment with severe harmful consequences for 
individuals, and the violation of rights explicitly protected by the 
Convention.88 
Within the ECHR system, environmental issues have generally 
been analyzed in terms of the right to respect for home and family 
life, as guaranteed by Article 8 of the Convention. In a number of 
judgments, the ECtHR has found that serious forms of environmental 
disruption affecting people in their places of residence can constitute 
violations of their right to respect for their home and family life. 
Under Article 8 of the Convention, its parties have an obligation to 
take the necessary environmental protection measures to prevent any 
interference in the exercise of this right.89 
In the seminal Lopez Ostra case, concerning pollution from a 
tannery, the Court found Spain guilty of violating Article 8 of the 
Convention owing to a lack of measures to prevent environmental 
conditions adversely affecting the quality of life of a person living 
near the plant in question, recognizing that “severe environmental 
pollution may affect individuals’ well-being and prevent them from 
enjoying their homes in such a way as to affect their private and 
family life adversely, without, however, seriously endangering their 
health.”90 In a more recent judgment, following a complaint made by 
people living near a chemical production plant, constituting a major 
accident hazard in Italy, the Court ruled that merely depriving a 
 
88 S.T. Ramnewash-Oemrawsingh, Human Rights and the Environment Interlocked: 
Dealing with Environmental Problems in a Human Rights Setting (Nov. 11, 2008) (Ph.D. 
dissertation, University of Amsterdam). 
89 COUNCIL OF EUROPE, MANUAL ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE ENVIRONMENT (2nd 
ed. 2012). 
90 Lopez Ostra v. Spain, 303 Eur. Ct. H.R. (1994). 
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person of “essential information” about the nature and extent of an 
industrial accident hazard in his or her immediate environment, to 
which he or she and his or her family are exposed, could constitute a 
violation of that person’s right to respect for his or her privacy and 
family life.91 
A significant number of cases brought under the ECHR concern 
noise pollution suffered by people living near airports. The line of 
cases begins in 1990, when the European Commission of Human 
Rights declared complaints from local residents under Article 8 of the 
Convention admissible.92 It accepted that, in principle, significant 
noise pollution could affect a person’s physical well-being to the 
extent that it impairs his or her private life. However, it also 
acknowledged that interference in the exercise of the right to private 
life could be justified by the general economic interest served by the 
operation of an airport.93 Therefore, there was no violation of Article 
8 of the Convention provided that the principle of proportionality had 
been respected in weighing different interests.94 
In a more recent, highly publicized case concerning Heathrow 
Airport, however, the Court first concluded that Article 8 had been 
violated, finding that the United Kingdom had permitted an increase 
in the noise pollution produced by night flights without giving serious 
consideration to the impact of this increased pollution on local 
residents’ sleep, and without seeking the least detrimental solution in 
terms of human rights.95 In this case, the country’s economic interest 
had not been properly weighed against the rights of the applicants, 
who were victims of the noise pollution.96 However, this judgment 
was overturned on appeal by the Grand Chamber of the Court, finding 
that the UK had not exceeded the “wide margin of discretion” it was 
entitled to in balancing the conflicting interests at stake.97 
In another landmark case, Öneryildiz, the ECtHR affirmed “that a 
violation of the right to life can be envisaged in relation to 
environmental issues, . . . liable to give rise to a serious risk for life or 
various aspects of the right to life.”98 It found Turkey guilty of 
 
91 Guerra et al. v. Italy, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1998). 
92 Powell & Rayner v. United Kingdom, 172 Eur. Ct. H.R. (1990). 
93 Id. at 14. 
94 Id. at 16. 
95 Hatton et al. v. United Kingdom, 172 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2001). 
96 Id. at 12. 
97 Hatton et al. v. United Kingdom (Grand Chamber), Eur. Ct. H.R. (2003). 
98 Öneryildiz v. Turkey, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2002). 
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violating the right to life of the residents of a shanty town located next 
to a landfill, who had lost their lives when their homes were buried in 
a landslide caused by an explosion of methane gas that had built up in 
the landfill due to the decomposition of the waste dumped there. The 
Court found that the Turkish authorities had failed to take the 
necessary measures recommended by technical experts to remove the 
methane gas, stabilize the landfill, and inform the slum dwellers of 
the serious hazards to which they were exposed. 
In the Tatar case, the ECtHR eventually expressly recognized the 
right to a “healthy and protected” environment.99 Nevertheless, even 
though this ruling acknowledged the existence of such a right, no 
obligations binding on states have yet been clearly identified by the 
Court as specifically flowing from the substantive right in question. 
The Tatar case did not specify any clear normative content or 
consequences of this right. 
Whatever the deficiencies in the recognition of the substantive 
right in the European human rights system, this system is clearly more 
advanced than EU law as regards the legal protection of the 
fundamental right to a healthy environment. The same can be said of 
the environmental rights regime established by the Aarhus 
Convention. 
The preamble to the Aarhus Convention, paraphrasing language 
from the 1972 Stockholm Declaration’s preamble, “recogniz[es] that 
adequate protection of the environment is essential to human well-
being and the enjoyment of basic human rights, including the right to 
life itself.” It establishes a conceptual link between substantive and 
procedural environmental rights by stating that “citizens must have 
access to environmental information, be entitled to participate in 
decision-making and have access to justice in environmental matters” 
in order “to be able to assert” their right to live in an environment 
adequate to their health and well-being, as well as to “observe” their 
concomitant duty “to protect and improve the environment for the 
benefit of present and future generations.”100 
Article 1 of the Aarhus Convention, under the heading “Objective,” 
then provides: 
 
99 Tatar v. Romania, EUR. CT. H.R. ¶¶ 107, 112 (2009). On the Tatar case, see Séverine 
Nadaud & Jean-Pierre Marguénaud, Chronique des arrêts de la CEDH 2008–2009, 2010 
REVUE JURIDIQUE DE L’ENVIRONNEMENT 61, 62–67 (2010). 
100 Aarhus Convention, supra note 40. 
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In order to contribute to the protection of the right of every person 
of present and future generations to live in an environment 
adequate to his or her health and well-being, each Party shall 
guarantee the rights of access to information, public participation in 
decision-making and access to justice in environmental matters in 
accordance with the provisions of this Convention.101 
The explicit recognition of the right to a healthy environment in the 
Aarhus Convention adds weight to its operative provisions for the 
implementation of the procedural rights of access to information, 
participation in decision-making and access to justice, by articulating 
the legal and philosophical underpinning of these rights. It indicates 
that they are not ends in themselves, but are meaningful precisely as 
means towards the end of protecting the individual’s substantive right 
to live in a healthy environment. 
It does not, however, have immediate legal consequences, as the 
provisions of Article 1 do not, as such, impose on the contracting 
parties any specific obligations beyond those laid down in the other 
provisions of the Convention.102 Indeed, the protection of the right to 
a healthy environment is presented as an objective to which the 
Aarhus Convention is intended to contribute, not as a substantive 
obligation distinct from the specific obligations with respect to access 
to information, participation and access to justice which it imposes on 
its contracting parties. It should also be noted that the language used 
in Article 1 of the Aarhus Convention implies that the parties 
acknowledge that guaranteeing the procedural rights laid down in the 
Convention will not in itself be sufficient to ensure the protection of 
the substantive right, but will only “contribute to” the achievement of 
that ultimate objective. 
 
101 Aarhus Convention, supra note 40, art. 1 (emphasis added). 
102 This was stressed by the United Kingdom in a declaration made upon signature of 
the Convention. According to this declaration, “[t]he United Kingdom understands the 
references in Article 1 and the seventh preambular paragraph of this Convention to the 
‘right’ of every person ‘to live in an environment adequate to his or her health and well-
being’ to express an aspiration which motivated the negotiation of this Convention and 
which is shared fully by the United Kingdom. The legal rights which each Party 
undertakes to guarantee under Article 1 are limited to the rights of access to information, 
public participation in decision-making and access to justice in environmental matters in 
accordance with the provisions of this Convention.” See Aarhus Convention, supra note 
40. While it is self-evident that the specific international obligations imposed on the 
contracting parties by the operative provisions of the Convention relate only to those 
procedural rights, this does not necessarily imply that, as the UK suggests, the provisions 
of the preamble and of Article1 relating to the substantive right can be dismissed as merely 
expressing an “aspiration.” This contradicts the very wording and title of Article 1, which 
refer to an “objective.” In legal terms, an objective is clearly not the same as an aspiration. 
It can inform and guide the interpretation of the other provisions of the Convention. 
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While conventional international law is clearly more advanced than 
EU law in this field, the former may well have legal consequences in 
the ambit of Union law and could ultimately influence the latter’s 
interpretation and evolution. 
Firstly, the human rights as guaranteed by the ECHR and 
interpreted by the ECtHR can actually be regarded as part of EU law 
on several grounds. On the one hand, they are to be regarded as 
general principles of EU law. Article 6, paragraph 3 TEU, as amended 
by the Lisbon Treaty, provides: 
Fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and as 
they result from the constitutional traditions common to the 
Member States, shall constitute general principles of the Union’s 
law.103  
On the other hand, the rights guaranteed by the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights (which has acquired legal force pursuant to 
Article 6, paragraph 1 TEU) that correspond to rights recognized in 
the European Convention must be given the same meaning and scope 
as they have under the ECHR.104 
Secondly, the EU is currently engaged in the process of acceding to 
the ECHR as a contracting party. This accession is required under 
Article 6, paragraph 2 of the TEU as amended by the Lisbon Treaty. 
The ECHR itself has recently been modified in order to make EU 
accession legally possible.105 The accession process is yet to be 
formally completed, but once the Union will have become a 
contracting party to the ECHR, all the fundamental rights enshrined in 
the ECHR will automatically be incorporated in the EU legal order. 
The same already applies to the provisions of the Aarhus Convention, 
as the ECJ has had the opportunity to affirm in a recent judgment, in 
 
103 Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty 
Establishing the European Communities, Dec. 13, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C 306) 1. 
104 This results from Article 52, para. 3 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, 
which provides: “In so far as this Charter contains rights which correspond to rights 
guaranteed by the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, the meaning and scope of those rights shall be the same as those laid down by 
the said Convention. This provision shall not prevent Union law providing more extensive 
protection.” Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, supra note 16, art. 52. 
105 Article 59 ECHR, as amended by Article 17, para. 1 of Protocol No. 14 to the 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Amending 
the Control System of the Convention, Council of Europe Treaty Series No. 194. This 
Protocol entered into force on June 1, 2010. 
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which it ruled that the access to justice provisions of the Convention 
form “an integral part” of the legal order of the European Union.106 
CONCLUSIONS 
Notwithstanding its claim to global leadership in environmental 
policy and law, the EU has a mixed record as regards the recognition 
of procedural and substantive environmental rights. While it has led 
in some areas, it has lagged behind in others. EU law evolved in close 
interaction with the relevant rules of conventional international law, 
especially those of the Aarhus Convention and the ECHR. In many 
instances the latter rules were more advanced than the internal law of 
the Union, and the EU had to adapt its legislation to comply with the 
international standards. In other cases, EU law actually led the way 
and served as a model for the development of conventional 
international law. 
The first Aarhus “pillar,” access to information, is a case in point in 
which reciprocal influences between EU law and the emerging 
international standards of the Aarhus Convention have occurred. The 
1990 EU Directive on access to environmental information and the 
experience in its implementation strongly influenced the 
Convention’s first “pillar” provisions.  The Aarhus provisions, in turn, 
had a significant impact on the European Commission’s proposal for 
a revision of that directive, which not only incorporated the 
improvements introduced by Aarhus but also went further and 
proposed new provisions not found in the Convention. Access to 
environmental information is an example of EU leadership. 
The other procedural environmental rights, public participation in 
decision-making and access to justice, were recognized in 
international law before being adopted in EU law. While the EU had 
some rudimentary provisions on information and consultation of the 
public in EIA and environmental permitting procedures from the mid-
1980s and mid-1990s respectively, the Aarhus Convention went way 
beyond EU law in articulating the right of participation in a range of 
environmental decision-making procedures in a detailed manner. 
Inspired by the Convention, the EU undertook a wholesale revision of 
a number of environmental directives to incorporate international 
participation standards in its internal law. In this instance, the EU 
acted as a follower rather than a leader. In the specific area of GMO-
related decision-making, the EU even behaved as an outright laggard, 
 
106 Case C-240/09, Lesoochranárske zoskupenie, supra note 14, at ¶ 30. 
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actively opposing the development of participatory requirements 
while the Aarhus Convention was being negotiated. It was only in 
2005, under strong internal and external pressure, that the EU gave up 
its opposition and accepted an amendment to the Convention setting 
out minimum requirements for public participation in decision-
making on the deliberate release of GMOs. 
Another important area in which the EU is an unrepentant laggard 
is access to justice. It has adopted access to justice provisions only in 
respect of the right of access to environmental information, and in the 
context of public participation procedures under the EIA and IPPC 
Directives, in order to comply with Article 9, paragraphs 1 and 2 of 
the Aarhus Convention. But, so far, it has failed to adopt any 
legislation to implement the more general access to justice 
requirements of Article 9, paragraph 3 of the Convention. In the 
absence of harmonized EU standards, it falls on individual member 
states to guarantee such access to justice, but most of them have 
dragged their feet and provide only limited access to review 
procedures for citizens and NGOs. Finally, the EU has not yet taken 
all the steps required to ensure access to justice at the level of its own 
institutions. The ECJ, based on a well-established case-law dating 
back to 1963, systematically denies access to judicial review to 
private claimants who are not “individually and directly concerned” 
by the acts of EU institutions and bodies they seek to challenge. 
As regards the legal recognition of a substantive human right to a 
healthy environment, the EU is not leading the way either. No such 
right is inscribed in the Union’s Charter of Fundamental Rights. 
Whatever recognition of the substantive right exists in Europe has 
been achieved by conventional international law, first and foremost 
by the Aarhus Convention. Despite the lack of any explicit 
environmental provisions, the European system for the protection of 
fundamental rights based on the ECHR has also contributed to the 
gradual affirmation of environmental human rights, through the 
progressive case-law of the ECtHR, which has recognized that serious 
environmental impairment may violate such rights as the right to 
home and family life and even the right to life itself. As a result, the 
EU’s impending accession to the ECHR is bound to strengthen the 
protection of environmental human rights in the Union’s legal order. 
Here too, the EU has been a follower rather than a leader. 
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